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Abstract: Although new technologies in plant breeding have the potential to 
reduce poverty and improve global food security, a shift in property regime 
for plant genetic resources (PGRs) prevents this potential from being realised. 
As the emergence of biotechnology has increased the value of PGRs, rent-
seeking behaviour by the plant breeding industry spurred the emergence of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) for improved plant varieties. Whereas this 
system is globally implemented through the TRIPS agreement, biodiversity-rich 
developing countries increasingly use the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) to protect their PGRs through state sovereignty. By using an economic 
perspective, this article aims to explain the appropriation of PGRs and the 
efficiency rationale that is used for its justification. However, as this perspective 
disregards the alarming consequences for smallholder farmers in developing 
countries, a global justice perspective is used to explore these effects. Focusing 
on distributional justice and the provision of the right to food, this article 
will demonstrate that the property regime shift for PGRs leads to decreased 
availability of, and access to, crops that are used by resource-poor farmers. 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA) and Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research 
(CGIAR) seem to be most promising in challenging the shift in property regime 
for PGRs and the global justice concerns this shift entails. 
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1. Introduction
The extent to which we will be able to reduce poverty and ensure food 
security will for a large part be determined by the evolution of the 
agricultural sector. This is especially true knowing that an estimated 
75 per cent of the world’s poor and hungry live in rural areas and depend 
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directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods (Kiers et al. 2008). 
Moreover, with the world population expected to reach 8.3 billion by 2030, 
of whom 90 per cent will live in developing countries, about 1.3 billion extra 
people will have to be nourished (Esquinas-Alcázar 2005). In the effort to 
meet the growing demand for food and to ensure that farmers will be able 
to cope with a changing climate, much will depend on the technological 
advancements made available in agriculture. As such, developing 
improved plant varieties through plant breeding has proven to be decisive 
in increasing agricultural production. Growth rates in yields achieved by 
traditional plant breeding are declining, but the emergence of biotechnology 
in plant breeding is now seen as a promising instrument to meet the growing 
demand for food. Focusing on its contribution to poverty reduction, the 
potential of biotechnology becomes even clearer when it is seen as a tool 
that can be tailored to developing countries’ needs and circumstances 
(Korthals 2005). 
Yet, the impacts of biotechnology have been very unbalanced so far; 
although we seem to be capable of producing more and more food, the highly 
unequal distribution of this basic good is among the most pressing ethical 
issues of today. While biotechnology-based research has led to improved 
crops that have increased yields and productivity in places where they 
have been adopted, these crops are hardly planted in the least developed 
countries (Zilberman et al. 2007). The main reason for this is that little or 
no biotechnology research has been conducted on crops that are planted by 
resource-poor farmers, such as cassava, sorghum, beans and white maize 
(Pray and Nazeem 2007). Instead, biotechnology is mainly used in research 
that focuses on crops that are used as animal foodstuffs and on crops that 
have the highest commercial value.  
As biotechnology has vastly increased the scope of the genetic diversity 
that can be included in the activity of plant breeding, the plant genetic 
resources (PGRs) that can be found around the world have become more 
valuable as potential input material for new products and inventions (De 
Jonge 2009). As a result, policy and institutional arrangements have also 
seen many changes over the last decades. Driven by the attempt to capture 
the increased value in PGRs, various interest groups are seeking to shape an 
institutional environment that allows them to appropriate these resources. 
The struggle over the control and ownership have gradually shifted the 
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“property regime”, as it is called by Roa-Rodríguez and Van Dooren (2008), 
from a common heritage system to a system that allows for different kinds 
of claims to this natural material. 
Thus, intellectual property rights (IPRs) have entered the contemporary 
arena, providing plant breeders the exclusive but time-limited right to 
commercially exploit their improved plant varieties. This advent has, in its 
turn, caused political debate about who owns the material that is used to 
develop these protected inventions or products. While the improved plant 
varieties are largely generated in developed countries, which also have the 
capacities for biotechnology research, it is chiefly the biodiversity-rich 
developing countries that provide the plant generic resources (PGRs) on 
which these improved plant varieties are ultimately based. This has led 
many such countries to seek ways to protect the PGRs within their borders 
and to find ways to be compensated for its use by others. 
The increased appropriation of the world’s extremely valuable PGRs 
mainly comes at the expense of smallholder farmers in developing countries. 
It has not only resulted in reduced access to seeds because of intellectual 
property protection, it has also indirectly influenced private and public 
research agendas in the plant-breeding sector. As the increasing value of 
PGRs plays such an important role in these developments, this article aims 
to explain the property regime shift by using an economic perspective. By 
fundamentally unpacking the term PGRs and the different values it holds, 
it will become clear that the appropriation of this material is not merely the 
result of interest groups seeking to obtain a share in the increased value. This 
article will also show that PGRs in their worked form – the improved plant 
varieties – have much in common with public goods and that this leads to 
an undersupply, which is, of course, inefficient and undesirable. However, 
apart from the objective to explain the shift in property regime for PGRs 
and the efficiency trade-offs it entails, this article also aims to show that 
this economic perspective is incomplete. Instead of solely being used to 
explain the relationship of economic phenomena, efficiency arguments are 
increasingly seen as a justification for the private appropriation of natural 
material, based on the premise that when markets cannot deliver efficient 
outcomes on their own, the government needs to implement public policies 
or institutions that support this aim. The article argues that the perfectly 
efficient allocation of resources, even when providing the greatest good 
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for the greatest number, is not necessarily satisfying. Instead, a so-called 
“global justice” point of view is used to evaluate the shift in property regime 
for PGRs, focussing particularly on distributional justice and the human 
right to food. This way, this article also aims to look forward and to identify 
those international institutions that can play a role in challenging the current 
property regime for PGRs in such a way that technological advances in 
agriculture are actually used to the benefit of those who are most in need.
2. The Enclosure of the PGR Commons
In order to understand the changing rules and institutions that regulate the 
ownership, creation and exploitation of PGRs, it is necessary to first explore 
and define the term itself. By doing this, it will become clear that the way 
PGRs are understood is closely related to the value that is attached to them. 
Yet, economists have encountered difficulties in determining the value of 
PGRs, as different sorts of value can be distinguished. Making it even more 
complex, although their value increases rapidly, PGRs appear to have certain 
characteristics that make it difficult to capture this increasing value and this 
is exactly what spurred the shift in its property regime.
2.1 Unpacking the Term PGRs
Because of its broad scope and prominence, PGRs are often described as the 
“building blocks of life”. They are the basis of our food products, as well 
as of a wide variety of products that derive from plants, such as medicines, 
pesticides and cosmetics. Because of these many uses and applications, there 
is a continuous search for PGRs that can be incorporated in the production 
systems to meet new demands and needs that result from new conditions 
such as population growth, climate change and the emergence of new 
diseases (De Jonge 2009). Although the uses of PGRs cover a wide field, the 
focus of this article will be on PGRs that are used for food and agriculture. 
In this sense, PGRs refer to the genetic material that can be found in wild 
plants, farmers’ varieties (landraces), and modern varieties (cultivars). 
In an attempt to tackle the complexity of PGRs and the property issues 
that these entail, some authors have distinguished raw PGRs from worked 
PGRs (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Helfer 2004; Rubenstein et al. 2005; 
Roa-Rodríguez and Van Dooren 2008). According to this classification, 
worked PGRs should be understood of as improved plant varieties that 
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result from the process of plant breeding. Raw PGRs refer to the genetic 
resources that can be found in their natural state. Thus, raw PGRs would 
be those found in the wild, such as a grass in a rain forest that has a not-
yet-discovered gene that can be used to breed higher yielding grains. 
Worked PGRs would be the products derived from that grass, such as an 
improved grain variety. Distinguishing between raw and worked PGRs will 
be very helpful in exemplifying current debates on the changing property 
regime for PGRs and both classes have shifted out of the common domain: 
worked PGRs through IPRs and raw PGRs through state sovereignty. The 
boundary between what we should call raw PGRs and worked PGRs can 
be very blurred and controversial. For the sake of explaining the current 
property regime, this article will view wild plants and farmers’ varieties 
as raw PGRs, while modern varieties are viewed as worked PGRs. Seeds 
and other PGRs held in national and international gene banks can be raw 
or worked since these collections generally contain all three classifications 
(Raustiala and Victor 2004).
The plant breeding industry depends upon the use of both raw and 
worked PGRs. Both are subject to a continuous search for traits that help to 
maintain a system that keeps away the always-evolving pests and predators 
of our food crops, as well as to unceasing attempts to improve these crops in 
terms of yield and nutritional value (Swanson and Göschl 2000). Although 
plant breeders will generally develop new plant varieties by using their own 
breeding populations, raw PGRs are used more frequently because of the 
new possibilities that arise with scientific advances. Especially the use of 
pre-breeding, which refers to all activities designed to transfer genes and 
gene combinations from raw PGRs into more usable breeding material, 
highly increases the possibilities to use raw PGRs in breeding improved 
plant varieties (Hausmann et al. 2004). 
2.2 The Increasing Value of PGRs
PGRs are tangible, but their value depends very much on people’s knowledge 
and interests. It is, therefore, increasingly recognised that there is an 
important informational component in PGRs. The role of this informational 
component, as well as its increasing importance, is best illustrated by the 
evolution of agricultural intensification and commercialisation over time. 
Primitive hunters-gatherer societies started the domestication of wild plant 
species, creating the basis for permanent agricultural systems. These early 
40     Asian Biotechnology and Development Review
farmers selected and replanted the best seeds and so improved crops in 
terms of suitability for human cultivation. Crop improvement evolved over 
thousands of years into the development of landraces – farmers’ varieties 
that are adapted to local growing conditions and consumption preferences. It 
was only some 100 years ago that crop improvement changed tremendously 
when conventional breeding of modern varieties was introduced, using 
genetic principles based on the phenotype or physical characteristics of an 
organism. During this phase, the first high-yielding hybrid maize varieties 
were produced as well as the semi-dwarf wheat and rice varieties that led 
to the Green Revolution some 60 years ago. The modern varieties that were 
developed in this period have been widely adopted and shaped the intensive 
agricultural production systems. The current phase of crop improvement 
research is based on molecular science, which also permits the introduction 
of genetic materials from sexually incompatible organisms. These new 
biotechnology tools greatly expanded the range of genetic variations that 
can be used in plant breeding (Raney and Pingali 2005). 
The agricultural intensification clearly illustrates how people’s 
knowledge and interests have changed the way new plant varieties are 
developed. Today’s new insights in molecular science, which can be used 
in both conventional breeding and genetic engineering, not only expanded 
the range of plant varieties that can be bred, it also highly accelerated the 
breeding process. Plant breeding has now become a specialised task that 
is no longer vertically integrated in farm operations and breeders are more 
and more perceiving PGRs as a “pool of genetic information” (Eaton 
2013). This information, found in genes or other subcellular components, 
reveals the particular characteristics and use of the tangible material. As 
Roa-Rodríguez and Van Dooren (2008: 3) put it: “Since the discovery of 
the DNA and with the advances of biotechnology that have permitted the 
characterisation of genetic material and diversified the ways in which the 
genetic information can be used, the informational component of the PGRs 
has become the main object of global regulation of property, relegating the 
tangible biological components to an unimportant second place”. 
2.3 IPRs for Improved Plant Varieties
In plant breeding, it is mainly the informational component of PGRs that 
determines the current and future values of these resources. These values are 
increasing rapidly as technological advancements greatly enlarge people’s 
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insights in the use of both raw and worked PGRs. However, the growing 
importance of the informational component in PGRs has paradoxically 
created difficulties in capturing this increased value. The reason for this is 
that information, and hence to a great extent improved plant varieties, have 
the characteristics of so-called public goods. 
In economics, the term public goods refer to those goods that are non-
excludable and non-rival in consumption. In simple terms, it means that it is 
not possible to prevent individuals from enjoying such goods once available 
and that the use of such goods by one individual does not compete with 
their use by others. These characteristics of public goods are generally seen 
as problematic since these allow third parties to free ride on its provision, 
leading to a permanent and inefficient undersupply of such goods. In 
order to solve this market failure, IPRs are put in place. IPRs provide the 
right to exclude others from commercialising an invention or product of 
a creative mind. Its legal framework currently protects creative products 
such as trademarks, technical inventions, databases, literary works, musical 
compositions, and plant varieties (Lévêque and Ménière 2004). As different 
sectors call for different rights regimes, IPRs should be seen as an umbrella 
term. Depending on the type of innovation, copyrights, patents, industrial 
designs, trademarks or trade secrets, are granted to the creator or inventor 
(Apte 2006). The economic justification of IPRs is that they solve market 
failures related to public goods. By offering an exclusive right for a limited 
period, intellectual property law addresses the problems of non-excludability 
and non-rivalry and it is generally claimed that this is realised by striking 
the balance between incentive and access: On the one hand, IPRs provide 
incentives for innovation and disclosure, while on the other hand they create 
a temporary and inefficient monopoly (Eckert and Langinier 2011). As a 
result of this mechanism, research and development (R&D) enterprises are 
made viable as they can market their products exclusively and recoup the 
invested costs of human and material capital during the monopoly period. 
After this period, the innovators lose their ability to obtain royalties (through 
licensing) and the innovation passes into the public domain, resulting in 
knowledge externalities that benefit society (De Jonge and Korthals 2006). 
The characteristics of public goods largely apply to improved plant 
varieties – or more accurately the seeds – which are the physical embodiment 
of the invention of the plant breeder. This invention is based on the idea of 
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crossing certain varieties in one way or another by using the insights into 
the possible results of this process (Eaton 2013). These ideas and insights 
(about traits, progeny, methods and tools) epitomise the informational 
component and are practically impossible to keep as a so-called trade 
secret. With modern techniques, it is becoming much easier for other 
breeders to read the genetic code of the improved plant variety and thus 
reap the benefits of the breeders work. Although one could theoretically 
prevent the seed from being used by others, this would not only make it 
impossible to commercialise the seed, it would also be a troublesome task 
because of the biological fact that plants are self-reproducing. If someone 
else acquired the seed, whether legally or not, it would be impossible for 
the breeders to prove that the genetic information used was exclusively 
theirs (Straus 2005). In line with the general justification, IPRs for improved 
plant varieties are put in place to address the inefficiency problem of public 
goods. Intellectual property protection for plant-related innovations reduces 
free riding and enables breeders to recoup their costs of investment. The 
exclusive protection through IPRs will not only benefit plant breeders in 
the form of royalties they can charge for their products, it will also benefit 
the consumers who use the invented superior products. Society as a whole 
would benefit because of the development of seeds and plants with new 
and favourable traits, together with the reduced requisite for governments 
to fund or subsidise such activities (Helfer and Austin 2011). 
When focusing on the evolution of IPRs for improved plant varieties 
specifically, it will appear that political-economic pressure from various 
interest groups has also played a determining role. Because of this, these 
IPRs should not only be seen as attributions of inventiveness, but also 
as a commercial tool and a source of power, both heavily influenced by 
technological change (Rajan 2006). IPRs steer innovation, but conversely, 
technological change steers the development of the IPR systems as they 
continuously present new challenges and disrupt the formation of various 
interest groups. The increased value of PGRs that this involves, has led to 
a process of institutional change driven by an interaction of various actors 
that seek to influence the adjustments to their advantage (Eaton 2013). 
This was also recognised by Raustiala and Victor (2004: 7), as they explain 
that “when the private value of a good rises, potential owners will agitate 
governments to change property rules to allow capture of the added value. An 
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increase in the value of the resource because of an exogenous circumstance, 
such as a technological development or the discovery of a new application, 
may create a sufficient incentive for the development of property rights”. 
Over time, countries have implemented IPRs systems for improved plant 
varieties in various forms, differing in, inter alia, their protection, duration, 
and the exemptions that are offered to use the material for further research. 
A comparison of the principal differences among IPRs for improved plant 
varieties is provided in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of Principal Differences among IPR Systems 
for Plant Varieties
UPOV 1978 UPOV 1991
Plant patents
(US)
Utility patents  
over plant  
varieties (US)
Protection Varieties of 
species listed 
by country
Varieties of 
all genera and 
species
Varieties of 
asexually 
reproduced 
plants, except 
uncultivated 
and tuber 
propagated 
plants
Varieties of sexually 
reproduced plants
Duration of 
Protection 
15-20 years, 
depending on 
crop
20-25 years, 
depending on 
crop
20 years 20 years
Requirements Novelty,
Distinctness,
Uniformity, 
and
Stability
Novelty,
Distinctness,
Uniformity, and
Stability
Novelty,
Distinctness, 
and
Stability
Novelty,
Utility,
Non-obviousness, 
and
Industrial application
Exclusive 
Rights
Multiplication 
of variety for 
commercial 
purpose
Multiplication 
of variety for 
commercial 
purpose
Reproduction 
or sale of 
patented  
plant
Multiplication 
of variety for 
commercial purpose
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Exemptions (i) For further 
breeding
(ii) For 
private 
and non-
commercial 
use
(i) For further 
breeding, 
restricted in 
case of EDV
(ii) For private 
and non-
commercial use
(iii) Farmers’ 
Rights 
permitted, 
taking into 
account the 
legitimate 
interest of the 
breeder
(i) Research 
exemption
(ii) Sexual 
reproduction of the 
claimed variety
(iii) Products derived 
from the variety
Source: Adapted from Helfer and Austin (2011) and Louwaars et al. (2005).
2.4 The International Landscape of IPRs
IPRs have entered the plant-breeding sector as a result of efforts to stimulate 
innovation and economic growth, as well as due to political-economic 
pressure from various interest groups. As IPRs systems may vary, national 
legislators implementing an adequate system need to balance the moral 
dimension of rights and the role of IPRs in increasing welfare in their 
country (Louwaars 2007). The simple reasoning that these legislators, 
therefore, need to implement the level of protection that best suits their 
countries’ characteristics and needs would ignore the fact that countries are 
part of a highly interdependent world economy. It is for this reason that the 
international landscape of IPRs has become a much-debated issue. 
IPRs are national in character, meaning that a patent – or any other 
type of intellectual property protection – is only valid in the country where 
it is assigned. If a patent is granted at the US patent office, for example, 
this patent is only valid in the US, unless the patent holder applies for, and 
secures, protection in additional countries. This implies that all countries in 
which the inventor wants to secure the exclusive rights over a certain product 
need to have in place at the least an adequate legal system of protection. 
Still, many developing countries lack such a legal system, especially 
when the protection of improved plant varieties or biological materials is 
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concerned (Falcon and Fowler 2002). As the inventions that are protected 
by IPRs are generally non-rival and non-excludable in nature, the most 
beneficial option for countries that want to use foreign technologies is to 
simply not provide intellectual property protection at all. This way, these 
countries would be able to free ride on the provision of foreign inventions 
(Louwaars 2007). Indeed, developing countries have been able to use 
inventions that were protected elsewhere, but this situation is changing 
rapidly. International treaties and conventions increasingly govern various 
aspects of the implementation of intellectual property protection on a global 
scale. The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) has a lead 
role in coordinating and collecting information on the existing IPRs and 
offers an important service in assisting developing countries to implement 
the legal requirements for an IPRs system (Wright and Pardey 2006). Yet, 
the most influential legal instrument that now regulates IPRs globally, the 
TRIPS agreement, has been negotiated outside of the international treaties 
and conventions that were traditionally associated with intellectual property 
protection. During the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is now the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), the multilateral agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) was negotiated. 
The TRIPS agreement contains minimum standards for the protection of 
intellectual property, which need to be implemented by all member countries 
of the WTO. When countries fail to do so, they may be subjected to a dispute 
settlement procedure within the WTO and receive trade sanctions in any 
possible area (Correa 1995). The development of the TRIPS agreement 
was highly influenced and monitored by international industries, especially 
from the US, in the areas of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, trademarks and 
copyrights (Wright and Pardey 2006). Although many spectators reckon 
the globalisation of IPRs to be in favour of technology providers, others 
argue that there is a correlation between the strength of IPRs in developing 
countries and the level of foreign direct investments (Lesser 2005; Kanwar 
and Evenson 2003; Maskus 2000). Certainly, the relationship between 
intellectual property protection and international trade has become highly 
contested in recent years. It has led to many international negotiations 
and disputes about international trade in general, but particularly about 
the implications for developing countries, which are concerned with their 
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decreased ability to use already existing technologies. The objectives of 
the TRIPS agreement are described in Article 7, specifying that: “The 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.” Yet, many 
developing countries perceive the TRIPS agreement as an impediment to 
the use of technological knowledge to promote public interest goals such 
as health, nutrition and environmental conservation (Juma 1999).
With regard to PGRs, Article 27.3 of the TRIPS agreement states that 
“plants (…) and essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants (…)” may be excluded from patentability. However, the same Article 
proceeds with prescribing that “members shall provide for the protection 
of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system 
or by any combination thereof.” The possibility to implement such a sui 
generis system has led to different legal systems in countries to protect 
their worked PGRs. While some WTO members have not used the TRIPS 
provision to exclude patent protection for worked PGRs, other countries 
have used this room for exemption and excluded plants, and in some cases 
all genetic material, from patent law. Even though other models could be 
included as well, most countries that exempt improved plant varieties from 
patent protection have implemented the UPOV 1991 Act as their sui generis 
system (Van Overwalle 2005). Surprisingly, there are very few countries that 
fully make use of the flexibilities under the TRIPS agreement in protecting 
worked PGRs, especially when developing countries are considered. Among 
the reasons for this is that many developing countries have given up the 
alternatives available under TRIPS in negotiations with their more powerful 
trading partners. Where the TRIPS agreement already forces developing 
countries to implement minimum standards in intellectual property law, 
there is also an increasing presence of bilateral trade agreements between 
these countries and their industrialised trading partners on IPRs provisions 
that go beyond the minimum TRIPS standards. These so-called TRIPS-plus 
agreements are usually negotiated bilaterally, requiring developing countries 
not only to become a member of UPOV, but also to introduce the more 
restrictive patent protection on plant varieties or genes (Louwaars 2007).
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2.5 The Demise of the Common Heritage System
IPRs have dramatically privatised worked PGRs, allowing for the protection 
of improved plant varieties as well as for smaller products or methods that 
are used in plant breeding. With the TRIPS agreement, this privatisation 
is further extended as it is gradually being implemented in the entire 
global trade system. Unlike worked PGRs, raw PGRs are not eligible for 
intellectual property protection since wild plants are not manipulated by 
man and landraces do not meet the uniformity and stability criteria (Aoki 
and Luvai 2007). Although the line between what should be considered raw 
and worked PGRs is often subject to debate, raw PGRs hence stayed out of 
the intellectual property regime and plant breeders and seed companies have 
long continued to gather raw PGRs from around the world in the belief that 
this material was genetic information that could not be owned (Raustiala 
and Victor 2004). But all this changed when biodiversity-rich countries 
insisted on the implementation of a global system that would regulate the 
appropriation of raw PGRs.
Traditionally, people have viewed PGRs as part of a global commons. 
This view was eminently reflected in the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources (IUPGR), which was adopted by approximately 100 
countries in 1983. The undertaking formed a nonbinding agreement that 
was negotiated under the FAO and stated: “The undertaking is based on the 
universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of 
mankind and consequently should be available without restriction” (FAO 
1983). Although the FAO Undertaking attempted to counter the ownership 
not only of raw, but also of worked PGRs, many industrialised countries 
refused to allow for open access to the latter. For raw PGRs, on the other 
hand, the FAO Undertaking meant that they were a freely accessible good, 
like information in the public domain, and without the exclusive preserve 
of any single user or nation. It practically meant that, during these times, 
researchers were allowed to freely collect samples of genetic material, 
without the obligation to obtain national government approval for these 
sampling activities (Safrin 2004). Nevertheless, this approach towards raw 
PGRs changed entirely with the Resolution of the International Undertaking 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in 1991 (Roa-
Rodríguez and Van Dooren 2008). In this resolution, the common heritage 
concept was subjected to the sovereignty of states over their PGRs. From 
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this moment onwards, the common heritage concept for PGRs was not 
only undermined by IPRs for worked PGRs, but also by state-sovereignty 
claims over raw PGRs.
The state sovereignty claims over raw PGRs were expanded when the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) came into force in 1992. The 
CBD is a multilateral agreement that resulted from environmental concerns. 
It originated from the idea that economic incentives were necessary in order 
for developing countries to conserve their biodiversity instead of seeking 
rapid gains through the destruction of nature (Aoki and Luvai 2007). In terms 
of ownership, the CBD clearly turns away from the common heritage idea 
as it holds that the conservation of biological diversity is a common concern 
of humankind but that states have sovereign rights over their biological 
resources (De Jonge 2009). The CBD did not just spring from environmental 
concerns. As a result of the emerging possibilities in biotechnology and the 
establishment of different systems for IPRs, the potential and use value 
of raw PGRs increased rapidly. Especially the poor but biodiversity-rich 
countries hoped that the CBD would give them the possibility to control the 
physical access to their raw PGRs, and through this, be able to capture the 
benefits from the use of these resources (Roa-Rodríguez and Van Dooren 
2008). It was for this reason that mainly developing countries favoured the 
protection of their genetic material, as these are the nations that harbour the 
greatest amount of the world’s genetic diversity (Safrin 2004). The CBD 
was also supported by the international environmental movement, which 
had a major share in the outcome of the negotiations and considered the 
sovereign rights over raw PGRs as an adequate incentive for poor countries 
to stimulate nature conservation. The prospect was that these countries 
would take measures to safeguard their potentially valuable raw PGRs as 
they were now recognised to be theirs. Designated as the “grand bargain”, 
the CBD had to provide access to genetic resources for the emerging bio-
industries in the North, in exchange for a fair share in the benefits of these 
resources for the South (De Jonge 2009). 
As from the entry into force of the CBD, access to raw PGRs need 
to take place based on prior informed consent and mutually agreed terms 
negotiated with the country of origin (Falcon and Fowler 2002). All of this 
would be done through a so-called “access and benefit sharing” framework 
that was set up with the Nagoya Protocol of the CBD and successive Bonn 
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Guidelines. The access and benefit sharing mechanism was generally seen 
as a tool for developing countries to redress an inherent imbalance of power 
with industrialised countries that have historically obtained raw PGRs free of 
charge. It addresses the seemingly unjust system in which raw PGRs flowed 
freely from developing countries to industrialised countries, while the flow 
of worked PGRs was protected through IPRs and sold for higher prices. 
However, these potentially positive regulations have tended to operate 
differently in reality. One major criticism of the CBD is that virtually all 
countries see themselves as providers and hence sellers of their raw PGRs. 
This, in combination with the fact that no country seems to be a buyer, has 
led to a decreased international transfer of raw PGRs. In many developing 
countries, legislation is now highly focused on access restriction, designed 
to prevent abuse instead of capturing a share in the benefits (Falcon and 
Fowler 2002). In addition, there is often a lack of clarity by user-countries 
as to which institutions have the authority to grant access, while on the 
part of the provider-countries there is often a lack of willingness to take 
responsibility to make such decisions (Louwaars et al. 2006). Another 
problem with effectively protecting the raw PGRs through the CBD is that 
it is practically impossible to control all transfers. This, again, has to do 
with the fact that PGRs carry information, which is naturally transferring 
among organisms, ecosystems and countries. Also, researchers only need 
small quantities for R&D. As a consequence of the above, it becomes a very 
difficult task to prevent anyone from smuggling biological material out of 
a country (Koopman 2005). 
3.  A Global Justice Perspective and Recovering the PGR Commons
Many scholars have studied the shift in property regime for PGRs, 
particularly the extension of IPRs through the TRIPS agreement, which 
is a much-debated issue in the current Doha Development Round of the 
WTO. However, in examining the effects of this property regime shift, 
scholars generally use a perspective that is limited to the effects it has on 
efficiency and economic growth. Using this narrowed focus, it is rather easy 
to explain the changes undergone in this sector. Justifications based on these 
explanations fit the so-called “market-failure paradigm”, holding that when 
markets cannot deliver efficient outcomes on their own, the government 
needs to implement public policies or institutions that support this aim 
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(Paavola 2009). From the same perspective, also the CBD can be seen as 
an attempt to solve comparable efficiency concerns, but in this case for raw 
PGRs. Apart from efforts having to do with access and benefit sharing, the 
CBD aims to establish a more efficient framework for the conservation and 
utilisation of the world’s genetic resources. By granting sovereign ownership 
over countries’ resources, the argument goes, the countries would make 
better decisions in the management of these resources because the option 
value would also be internalised in these decisions. 
It is undeniably helpful to evaluate the shift in property regime for 
PGRs from an economic perspective that focuses on efficiency and 
overall growth. Yet, this perspective falls short in fully explaining the 
reasons for the emergence of the institutions that have privatised PGRs, 
let alone the consequences that this entails. First of all, the efficiency 
justification disregards the fact that both IPRs and the CBD were heavily 
shaped by political-economic motives, intended to take advantage of the 
opportunities that arose with the emergence of biotechnology in the plant 
breeding sector. More important, the institutions that have enclosed the PGR 
commons are often criticised because they do not sufficiently meet – or even 
obstruct – other ethical standards than the efficiency criterion, namely that 
of distributional justice and the provision of human rights.
%H\RQGWKH0DUNHW)DLOXUH3DUDGLJP
From the distributional justice and human rights perspectives, which can be 
grouped under the term “global justice”, the perfectly efficient allocation of 
resources is not essentially the most desirable ethical standard. The global 
justice perspective arises from the idea that the world is largely unjust. It 
is often used to refer to the global requirements of justice, conceived as a 
special class of reasons for action that apply primarily to the institutional 
structure of political and economic life (Beitz 2005). Although more specific 
views on global justice diverge, common grounds are the high level of 
attention that is given to inequality and the importance of providing basic 
human rights. The prominent philosopher Peter Singer, for example, pleads 
for uniform standards and rules that can create equality between human 
beings, as well as between and within states. According to his view, this 
should be achieved through international institutions and agencies that can 
restrain the egotism of richer states in defending their interest against poorer 
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states. Another philosopher in this field, Thomas Pogge, also emphasises 
the need for institutional reform and political relationships, but more from 
the reasoning that rich peoples have the obligation to improve the situation 
of the poor (Pogge et al. 2010). But it is not in the scope of this article to 
thoroughly discuss the concept of global justice or the differences in its 
precise perceptions. Instead, the global justice concept will be used in its 
broader sense, based on the principles of equality and universality. This way, 
using the perspective of global justice to evaluate the institutions responsible 
for the changing property regime for PGRs, will lead to interesting insights 
that would not be obtained by simply using the market failure paradigm. 
3.2 Distributional Justice
Examining IPRs for improved plant varieties shows that there are various 
alarming distributional consequences and they can be categorised, as 
was also done by DeCamp (2007), according to the means by which they 
influence the distribution of objects: a) the type of objects that will be 
developed: availability; b) the differences in access that people have to 
these objects: access; and c) the distribution of the IPRs themselves among 
various actors: concentration.
3.2.1 Availability 
Since commercial plant breeders and seed companies have the motive to 
make profit, their research is generally focused on innovations that are 
likely to generate high sales. Crops that are grown by small-scale farmers, 
especially those in developing countries, are, therefore, generally under-
researched. As such, very little research has been directed towards crops such 
as sorghum, millet and cassava (De Schutter 2009). This is because these 
so-called orphan crops would only be used by the capital-poor, making it 
an unprofitable target for research in the private sector (Falcon and Fowler 
2002). According to a calculation by Beintema and Stads (2008) only 6 
per cent of privately funded agricultural research is focused on developing 
country agriculture. 
The evolution of IPRs in plant breeding has not only created a system 
in which there is merely an incentive to invent or produce products that are 
targeted towards the capital-rich; it has also allowed for the privatisation 
of this industry. As improved plant varieties were previously considered to 
be a public good, the provision of such goods greatly depended on public 
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research institutes and public funding. This gradually began to change 
since the 1930s, as since then there has been a steady increase in the level 
of private investment in plant breeding research. Yet, it was only from 
the 1990s onwards that the share of these private investments increased 
dramatically when a small number of agribusiness giants began to direct 
large amounts of money into biotechnology. Although public breeding 
programmes continued to operate in many countries, there has been a 
general withdrawal from seed production activities by public organisations 
(Morris et al. 2006; Thirtle et al. 2001). Moreover, the National Agricultural 
Research Institutes (NARIs) that do continue their plant breeding activities 
are often confronted with a dilemma as IPRs have changed the institutional 
environment. To be more precise, researchers working at NARIs and 
universities have been increasingly stimulated by research administrators 
to protect their created knowledge because they see the possibility to create 
additional income by licensing the invented and protected plant varieties 
(De Jonge 2009). However, the ability to actually receive such incomes 
very much depends on the farmers’ demand for these varieties. As it is 
clearly stated by Louwaars et al. (2005: 4): “There is a danger that this 
heterogeneity may be translated into inequitable and questionable public 
research resource allocations, further reducing research on orphan crops 
and a smallholder focus in favour of breeding objectives and methodologies 
directed at large-scale commercial production”. Public policymakers and 
research managers, therefore, need to carefully consider the extent to which 
IPRs are used in public plant breeding. If NARIs are forced to redirect their 
breeding strategies simply to remain financially viable, governments should 
provide the necessary funds for research.
As commercial seeds are increasingly directed to the capital-rich, 
many of the seeds that are currently found on the market create specific 
implementation problems for smallholder farmers in developing countries. 
Although these seed varieties often have the potential to improve yields, 
sufficient additional inputs such as water and fertilisers are needed to 
achieve this end. Because of insufficient income, poor farmers are often not 
able to acquire such additional inputs. Moreover, these commercial seeds 
are generally directed to agro-ecological environments that are suitable 
for large-scale mono cropping. As poor farmers are generally situated in 
areas with specific environmental challenges (such as height or drought), 
landraces are often more appropriate (De Schutter 2009). 
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3.2.2 Access
Access to improved plant varieties protected by IPRs is restricted in the 
sense that farmers, only to a limited extent, are allowed to save, exchange 
and sell the harvested seed of the protected plant variety. Especially for 
smallholder farmers in developing countries, who traditionally rely on 
these practices, such restrictions could have detrimental consequences. It 
is for these reasons that the national implementation of “Farmers’ Rights” 
can make a huge difference in accessing protected varieties (De Schutter 
2009). Farmers’ Rights allow farmers who purchase seed of a (through 
IPRs) protected variety to save from those crops and to replant without 
additional payments (Aoki and Luvai 2007). These rights, which vary 
heavily among countries and among the different UPOV Acts, emerged 
from the imbalance in the options for protection of raw PGRs and worked 
PGRs. While improved plant varieties are eligible for intellectual property 
protection, local farmers’ varieties or landraces are considered raw 
PGRs that cannot be owned. However, there is something significantly 
controversial about this distinction, as farmers have grown, selected and 
replanted their PGRs for thousands of years. The landraces that resulted 
from these practices do not qualify for legal protection, yet many of these 
landraces are used by plant breeders to develop improved plant varieties, 
which are then protected, and in some cases, sold to these same farmers. The 
introduction of Farmers’ Rights is an attempt to restructure this imbalance 
and to recognise farmers as the historic, present, and future stewards and 
innovators of PGRs (De Jonge and Korthals 2006). Deplorably, the UPOV 
1991 Act dramatically limited Farmers’ Rights. The seed industry greatly 
lobbied their governments, resulting not only in the entire prohibition to 
sell some of the harvested seeds, but also in the inclusion of Article 15.2 
that made Farmers’ Rights optional and allowed each UPOV member to 
decide whether or not to introduce these rights in their national laws (Helfer 
and Austin 2011).  
3.2.3 Concentration
The emergence of IPRs in plant breeding has led to a significant increase in 
concentration in the seeds business. Especially the entrance of agrochemical 
companies in the commercial seed sector has resulted in the unprecedented 
convergence between the key segments of the agricultural market. In 2008, 
the top 10 seed companies already represented 67 per cent of the global 
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protected seed market, with Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta, the top three 
of this market, accounting for 47 per cent of this share (De Schutter 2009). 
This increasing concentration is even more apparent in the agricultural 
biotechnology sector, in which six companies controlled 98 per cent of 
the market for protected biotech crops in 2003 (Tansey and Rajotte 2008). 
These few companies now control many key patents that are needed in the 
industry, thereby increasing the barriers for new firms to enter the sector. In 
order to gain control over their protected material, as well as to be able to 
retain freedom to operate, larger companies often acquire smaller companies. 
DuPont, for example, paid 9.4 billion dollar for the company Pioneer, simply 
to strengthen its seed operation in maize (Falcon and Fowler 2002). 
7KH5LJKWWR)RRG
Even though there are divergent views on global justice, the most important 
views share the recognition of basic human rights (Timmermann and Van 
den Belt 2013). When evaluating the consequences of IPRs for worked 
PGRs, there is one human right that is of specific concern: Many scholars 
and politicians have raised the question whether there should be a human 
right to food. Such a human rights framework could help countries not only 
to oblige themselves to make agricultural policies that maximise yields, 
but also to make policies that primarily influence who will benefit from 
those yield increases. It would require countries to place at the centre of 
their efforts the needs of the most disregarded groups (De Schutter 2009). 
At the World Food Summit in 1996 and the Millennium Summit in 2000, 
for example, the government representatives declared that each person has 
a right to adequate food that is safe and culturally appropriate (Pinstrup-
Anderson and Watson II 2011). Even more binding is the formulation of 
the human right to food in the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), a multilateral treaty of the United Nations. 
Article 11 of the ICESCR imposes three primary obligations on governments 
in the realisation of the right to food. First, countries have to respect access 
to adequate food, meaning that they should not take any measures that 
would prevent this access. Intellectual property protection without adequate 
recognition of Farmers’ Rights could be seen as such a measure, since this 
obstructs the informal seed systems of farmers and hence their access to 
food. Second, countries have the obligation to protect the right to food. In 
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India, this has resulted in the recommendation to provide state subsidies that 
enable farmers’ access to re-usable generic seeds and so to eliminate their 
increasing dependency on multinational seed enterprises. Third, states have 
the obligation toIXO¿OWKHULJKWWRIRRG. With regard to worked PGRs, this 
could mean that governments have to promote agricultural research that is 
directed at orphan crops, with the result that everyone will have access to 
adequate food (De Schutter 2009).
Interestingly, the right to food seems to be counterbalanced by Article 15 
of the same ICESCR, which states that everyone has the right to protection 
of the moral and material interest resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author. However, the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights seems to clarify this jeopardised 
balance by concluding that intellectual property is a social product and has 
a social function. It further notes that member parties have a duty to prevent 
unreasonably high costs for access to plant seeds or other means of food 
production (De Schutter 2009).
+RZWKH&%')DLOVWR%ULQJ*OREDO-XVWLFH
Where the appropriation of worked PGRs through IPRs can be seriously 
criticised from a global justice perspective, this appears to be different for the 
appropriation of raw PGRs as the CBD was partly set up to address global 
justice concerns. These concerns are reflected in the avowed objective of 
the CBD, which explicitly states that there should be a “fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources”. 
Clearly, this benefit sharing aims at significant distributive effects as it is 
predicated on a bilateral model of exchange and compensation based on the 
sovereign rights that states have over their PGRs. This way, poor countries 
are to be compensated for their contribution to the production of improved 
plant varieties by offering their raw PGRs (De Jonge 2009). 
Despite affirmations in the CBD that states must provide “facilitated 
access” to the PGRs on which they have sovereign rights, it has failed to 
generate a significant flow in these resources. In fact, as it appears so far, the 
CBD has been a major obstacle to the access to PGRs by both researchers 
and the bio-industry (De Schutter 2009). Hence, instead of creating a global 
justice institution that protects the interest of poorer states against the 
egotism of richer states (as is advocated by Peter Singer), the sovereign 
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ownership of raw PGRs is obstructing the flow of germplasm on which 
the agricultural sector historically depends (De Jonge and Korthals 2006). 
As a matter of fact, a continuing flow of the world’s genetic resources is 
considered to be essential for global food security in the long run (De Jonge 
2009). That PGRs have been distributed around the world for millennia 
can be easily illustrated. For example, it is estimated that Bangladeshi 
rice contains four varieties from its own landraces and 229 “borrowed 
landraces” coming from other countries. Rice from the US comprises 219 
native landraces and 106 borrowed landraces. Several studies suggest that 
similar interdependence applies to all major food crops (Blakeney 2009). 
Hence, even though the CBD has been an attempt to address global justice 
concerns about the unfair distribution of resources itself, it has indirectly 
caused the emergence of another global justice concern, namely that of 
food security and accordingly a possible violation of the right to food. 
Instead of pursuing the right to food and the more equitable distribution 
of PGRs through steering the highly unequal direction in plant breeding 
towards the benefit of smallholder farmers in developing countries, many 
efforts are now being made to claim ownership of raw PGRs and to prevent 
its misappropriation. Based on the CBD, the national access regimes are 
adopted in a context of fears of biopiracy and a lack of compensation for 
the benefits that commercial exploitation of PGRs could generate. Even 
though the emergence of the regimes have created awareness about the 
importance and potential value of PGRs, the main consequence is that these 
regimes have been essentially protective, aimed at preventing rather than 
promoting the use of PGRs for research. Of course, biopiracy should be 
condemned and mechanisms to share in the benefits of the worlds PGRs 
should be sought. But such efforts so far have mainly increased what Safrin 
(2004) has called the “hyperownership” of PGRs in which an interactive 
spiral of increased IPRs-enclosure leads to increased sovereign-based 
enclosure, resulting in the sub-optimal utilisation and improvement of 
these resources. Box 1 shows the example of Peru, a biodiversity-rich 
country, where both the Peruvian government and Andean farming and 
indigenous communities heavily protect their PGRs in their fight against 
potential misappropriation. 
57
Box 1 Continued...
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Peru is one of the 10 mega-diverse countries in the world. With three large 
and different regions (coastal plains, the Andes and the Amazon jungle), it has 
almost all scientifically recognised life zones. Perhaps the most spectacular 
example of Peru’s biodiversity is the potato, which is an easily grown plant, 
producing more food on less land faster than any other crop. Being the third 
most important food crop in the world, after rice and wheat, the potato has 
become a major carbohydrate in the diet of hundreds of millions of people 
in developing countries (CIP 2008). The cultivated potato traces its origins 
to Andean and Chilean landraces that were developed by pre-Colombian 
cultivators. Although disputed, the precise location of its origin is argued to be 
Peru (Spooner et al. 2005), where potato farming goes back to 5,800 BC and 
which is home to between 2,000 and 2,500 native potato varieties (Scott 2011). 
Like many other mega-diverse countries, Peru is primarily concerned 
with the control and protection of its PGRs. In this light, Peru and her 
neighbouring countries Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador (together they form 
the Andean Community), adopted Decision 391, a legal framework that 
regulates a Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources. As can be read 
in Article 5, Decision 391 aligns with the CBD as it states: “The Member 
Countries exercise sovereignty over their genetic resources and consequently 
determine the conditions for access to them, pursuant to the provisions of 
this Decision” (Coloma 2010: 80). With this Decision, these countries hoped 
that such a form of protectionism would result in well-negotiated contracts 
with user countries or companies, and so to gain from their rich biodiversity 
(Correa 2005). This was not inconceivable as these countries already found 
that biotechnology firms in industrialised countries had been using their 
biodiversity. As there was no or limited compensation for this use, some 
of these practices had been portrayed in the media as cases of biopiracy 
(Ruiz 2012). In 2002, for instance, the National Institute for the Defense of 
Competition and Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) found that an invention 
based on a Peruvian plant, Maca, had been granted to Pure World Botanicals. 
In order to determine whether biopiracy indeed applied, a working group was 
set up to look into the case. When this working group discovered that there 
were numerous other patents related to Maca, as well as hundreds of patents 
related to other plants of Peruvian origin, it was transformed into a longer-
term body that would look into biopiracy cases since 2001: The National 
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Commission for the Prevention of Biopiracy. Since then, the Commission has 
identified, analysed, and taken action against many cases of biopiracy (Ruiz 
2012). With the Supreme Decree 003-2009-MINAM, which is Peru’s national 
implementation of Decision 391, Peru hopes to make access and benefit 
sharing a reality. The idea of this regulation is not to forbid companies from 
using their genetic resources, but to be fairly awarded for their use. However, 
there has not been any successful case of access and benefit sharing so far. 
The Peruvian government is not the only stakeholder that is highly 
concerned with the protection of its PGRs. Over the past decades, Andean 
farming and indigenous communities have increasingly become aware of 
the vast interest in their PGRs, especially the diverse potato varieties they 
cultivate. Although their argumentations partly overlap with those of the 
Peruvian State, the Andean farming and indigenous communities fight against 
biopiracy from different moral positions, based on their own worldviews 
and traditions. In the fear of misappropriation of their PGRs and associated 
traditional knowledge, these farmers often consider both the State and national 
and international research centers as intruding forces that come to take 
their genetic resources without giving anything in return (De Jonge 2009). 
Source: Author’s compilation.
3.5 Challenging the Shift in Property Regime for PGRs 
Examining the consequences of the shift in property regime for PGRs shows 
that current institutions do not seem to work to the benefit of smallholder 
farmers in developing countries. Although the potential of biotechnology 
in plant breeding is enormous, it appears to be mainly the powerful seed 
businesses that actually make use of it. Quite apart from the fact that these 
resources are directed to capital-rich farmers in developed countries, IPRs 
restrictions hamper such varieties to be taken up in developing countries’ 
seed systems. Yet, challenging the shift in property regime for PGRs should 
not be sought through further enclosing the PGR commons. Instead, PGRs 
should be shared and national and international research institutes should 
increase their focus on breeding plant varieties that will benefit those 
that are neglected by the private sector. It is in this light that two specific 
institutions that have so far been left out of this analysis, seem to be very 
promising: the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) and the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  
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The ITPGRFA can be understood as an attempt to counteract the access 
and use restrictions of PGRs erected by state sovereignty and IPRs, and 
so as to create an institutional framework that better suits the agricultural 
sector. The Treaty was established by the FAO in 2001 and is currently 
ratified by over 120 countries. Central to the ITPGRFA is its Multilateral 
System, through which 64 key crops and forages can be accessed freely 
by the member countries. These key crops, which are estimated to provide 
about 80 per cent of humanity’s food of plant origin, can be seen as a 
recovered commons since contracting parties of the ITPGRFA are obliged 
to provide facilitated access to these PGRs as if they are in the public 
domain (Louwaars et al. 2006). 
The ITPGRFA is primarily concerned with countries’ shared interest 
in food security. Knowing that no country is self-sufficient in its PGRs 
for food and agriculture, it is obvious that the facilitated access of these 
resources can be of great advantage for food production across the world. 
Although it is still difficult to measure the impact of the ITPGRFA, it is 
very likely to be a crucial step in making available PGRs for research 
and development objectives. Interestingly, the ITPGRFA also clearly 
expresses a distributional intention of the Multilateral System, asserting 
that the accruing benefits “should flow primarily, directly and indirectly, to 
farmers in all countries, especially in developing countries, and countries 
with economies in transition, who conserve and sustainably utilise plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture” (FAO 2009: 22). Hence, the 
ITPGRFA can be easily linked to distributional justice and human rights 
objectives and this connection becomes even more evident when the 
inclusion of the international genebanks of the CGIAR centres are taken 
into consideration.
The CGIAR is an international organisation that funds and coordinates 
research into agricultural crop breeding with the goal of reducing rural 
poverty, increasing food security, improving human health and nutrition 
and ensuring a more sustainable management of natural resources. 
Its establishment can also be seen as an effort to preserve historically 
productive practices of sharing and free exchange of agricultural material, 
and so to actively respond to the increasing availability of proprietary 
protection. Over four decades, the number of research centres that 
are supported by the CGIAR grew from 4 to 15, which are currently 
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coordinated by the CGIAR Consortium. Although guided by policies 
and research directions set by the Consortium Board, all 15 research 
centres are independent non-profit research organisations, innovating on 
behalf of the poor. These research centres are located all over the world 
and each research centre has its own expertise. The CGIAR currently 
houses more than 600,000 unique accessions of plant germplasm. Many 
of these accessions are derived from locally essential food staples. It can 
be seen as the most important international collection of PGRs, at least in 
terms of the diversity and quantity of accessions. These PGRs are freely 
supplied on the request of farmers, scientists and breeders (Marden and 
Godfrey 2012).
Although originally the focus of the CGIAR has been on increasing 
food production to avoid mass starvation, the focus has shifted over 
the years, concentrating increasingly on making available both raw and 
worked PGRs for research and plant improvement that is specifically 
targeted to address food security and productivity of the poor in developing 
countries (Gotor et al. 2010). Comparable to concerns about the restricted 
access to PGRs that have led to the ITPGRFA, the CGIAR had concerns 
regarding the accessibility of its collections and the extent to which this 
would be hampered with the rise of IPRs and the foundation of the CBD 
(Marden and Godfrey 2012). Attempts within the international community 
to secure the open access of PGRs resulted in the so-called In-Trust 
Agreement (ITA), which is an agreement between the CGIAR and the 
FAO. The ITA formalised the legal status of the CGIAR germplasm as 
freely available and was thus included in the Multilateral System of the 
ITPGRFA for the benefit of humanity (Gotor et al. 2010).
The ITPGRFA and CGIAR do not only show similarities with the 
distributional justice and human rights objectives that are associated with 
global justice, the goals of these institutions also strongly contrast with 
the shift in property regime for PGRs that is currently hampering these 
objectives from being realised. Yet, the changing institutional environment 
has caused many challenges for these international institutions. In the 
last 15 years, there has been a significant decline in the CGIAR centres’ 
ability to acquire and conserve additional PGRs. According to a recent 
study of Halewood et al. (2012: 100) in which the genebank managers 
of the CGIAR centres were surveyed in 2006 and 2011, these declines 
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mainly have to do with the “highly politicised nature of access and benefit 
sharing issues at the international, national and local levels, combined with 
low levels of legal certainty”. Knowing that Peru is among the countries 
that most actively try to put in place the needed legislation to protect 
its PGRs as well as to reap the benefits from its use, it is not surprising 
that the International Potato Centre (CIP), which is one of the CGIAR 
research centres and situated in Peru, is regularly confronted with the 
above-described struggles. Yet, as it is shown in Box 2, analysing the 
strategies that are used by CIP demonstrates the ability of these institutions 
to reverse the shift in property regime for PGRs in order to make sure 
that the newly emerging possibilities in plant breeding are actually used 
to benefit the world’s poorest. 
Box 2: The Challenge of Sharing PGRs in a Protectionist 
Country
With Peru being the centre of origin of the potato, as well as the many 
different potato varieties that are used by farmers in the Andes, the location 
of the International Potato Centre (Centro Internacional de la Papa, CIP) in 
Peru is by no means unplanned. Being located in a country with such a huge 
diversity in potato varieties, CIP greatly benefits from its environment.  The 
different potato varieties that are found in the Andean region are an important 
source for their current and future breeding activities. These varieties are, 
therefore, carefully conserved through storage in the CIP genebank, but also 
on small plots of land through cultivation. CIP attempts to use these PGRs to 
develop improved potato varieties for potato farmers in the Peruvian Andes, 
as well as for farmers in other parts of the world. Focusing on developing 
countries, potatoes and sweet potatoes are not only cultivated in South 
America, they are also cultivated in large parts of Africa and Southeast Asia. 
This ensures that Peru, or even South America, is not necessarily the primary 
target area for CIP. In fact, because of the highly diversified Andean potato 
systems, impacts of improved potato varieties are often potentially higher 
in Africa or Asia from a development perspective. Nevertheless, CIP also 
devotes meaningful attention to the production of potatoes in the Andean 
region, which can easily be illustrated by the large number of programmes to 
alleviate hunger and poverty among farmers in the High Andes (Vroom 2009). 
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Resulting from the changing political and legal environment embodied 
in Decision 391, as well as the opposition by Andean farming and indigenous 
communities, a political impasse on the management of PGRs has arisen 
in Peru. For CIP, this means that it is confronted with new challenges in 
achieving its objective to produce international public goods through releasing 
breeding material that is directed towards the alleviation of hunger and poverty 
(CIP 2006). As CIP has seen severe obstructions to add new acquisitions to 
its genebank, it heavily relies on the ITPGRFA (ratified by Peru in 2003), 
which is now by far the most important way to share its PGRs. Meanwhile, 
CIP has increasingly used a so-called multi-stakeholder approach. From the 
starting point of respecting the proprietary interests of the private sector, the 
Peruvian government and the Andean farming and indigenous communities, 
CIP aims to regain trust and to reshape opposition into partnerships that could 
contribute to its global justice perspectives. Thus, in acknowledging Peru’s 
worries of biopiracy, CIP collects and conserves their PGRs in a completely 
transparent way. Although a major breakthrough still seems far away, there 
is consultation with the government of Peru on how to overcome the impasse 
on a regular basis. In recent years, CIP has also increased the involvement of 
Andean farming and indigenous communities, which easily becomes evident 
by exploring some specific collaboration activities. As such, CIP developed a 
catalogue of the native potato varieties that are cultivated by various farming 
communities in the Huancavelica region in Peru. By showing portraits of 
the families that grow these potatoes and specific information about the 
genetic make-up of these varieties, this catalogue is not only a tool for these 
communities to hold onto this knowledge, but also to protect the intellectual 
property by means of publication (De Jonge 2009). By doing this, CIP 
acknowledges the great contribution of these communities in creating these 
potato varieties and associated traditional knowledge. Another example is the 
so-called repatriation agreement between CIP and the Potato Park in which 
CIP scientists committed to repatriate potato varieties from the genebank to 
local farmers and to conserve them in the Potato Park. This agreement, signed 
in 2006, was established to protect both the genetic diversity of the region’s 
potato varieties and the rights of the farming communities to control access 
to these resources. While this repatriation ensures that the genetic material 
does not become subject to IPRs, the agreement does not hamper collaborative 
research between CIP and scientists elsewhere, provided that this would not 
be used for exploitative or commercial purposes (Dias and Da Costa 2008).
Source: Author’s compilation.
Box 2 Continued...
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4. Conclusion
The emergence of biotechnology has created new insights into the possible 
uses of PGRs. Focusing on agriculture, this technological advancement 
has greatly expanded and accelerated the use of these resources in the 
development of improved plant varieties. Driven by the attempt to capture 
the increased value in PGRs, various interest groups are seeking to create 
an institutional environment that allows them to appropriate these resources. 
As a result, intellectual property protection for improved plant varieties 
is gradually implemented by governments around the world. In its turn, 
the emergence of IPRs for improved plant varieties have caused political 
debate about who owns the material that is used to create these protected 
inventions and products. While worked PGRs were increasingly subject to 
legal protection, raw PGRs have long continued to be gathered by plant 
breeders and seed companies in the perception that these belonged the 
“common heritage of mankind”. However, when the CBD came into force 
and countries started to claim sovereignty over their raw PGRs, the property 
regime for PGRs had almost entirely shifted from a system in which these 
resources were available to everyone and appropriable by no one, to a system 
in which these resources can be protected by means of sovereignty-based 
rights and IPRs. 
Although the economic perspective has proven to be useful in explaining 
the shift in property regime for PGRs, this perspective is incomplete in the 
sense that it disregards the alarming consequences for farmers in developing 
countries. IPRs for improved plant varieties only seem to address the 
undesired undersupply of those crops that are mainly used by capital-rich 
farmers in developed countries. Also, with the weak implementation of 
Farmers’ Rights, access to protected plant varieties is restricted in the sense 
that farmers are scarcely allowed to save, exchange and sell the harvested 
seed of these varieties. As a response to the increasing value of PGRs and 
its appropriation through IPRs, many developing countries are adopting 
protective national access regimes. However, instead of creating effective 
access and benefit sharing practices, these regulations have further degraded 
the common heritage system. Moreover, the sovereign ownership of raw 
PGRs threatens the world’s food security because it obstructs the flow of 
germplasm on which the agricultural sector depends. The hyperownership 
of PGRs results in the sub-optimal utilisation and improvement of these 
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resources. Instead of further enclosing the PGR commons, PGRs should, 
therefore, be shared and public research institutes should increase their 
focus on those plant varieties that can be used by the world’s poorest. 
The ITPGRFA and CGIAR seem to be the institutions in best position to 
seriously challenge the shift in property regime for PGRs and the global 
justice concerns that this shift entails.
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